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THE KFW AND COVID-19: 
COORDINATING PUBLIC FINANCE 
RESPONSES AT HOME AND ABROAD
The KfW is a German public development bank with decades of institutional history and substantial financial capacity. When the Covid-19 pandemic hit Germany, the KfW formed 
part of the Government’s coordinated financial response, collabo-
rating with public authorities to deliver rapid and substantial sup-
port at home and abroad. In this moment of crisis, the KfW has 
made use of its accumulated resources and expertise to facilitate a 
pro-public response. The KfW offers important lessons about the 
importance of building up public banking capacity and about hav-
ing the democratic structures in place to mobilize public banks in 
the public interest.
INTRODUCTION
Germany is often singled out in the media as having, by and large, 
coordinated a successful response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Its 
first confirmed coronavirus case was in Munich on February 27, 
2020 (Wieler et al. 2020). The outbreak was not unexpected, given 
what was happening in China and Italy, and plans were already 
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underway to begin dealing with the novel virus threat. By the end 
of February, Germany reported 26 confirmed cases, and travellers 
from high-risk countries like China and Italy were required to pro-
vide contact details. Over the next month or so, gatherings of more 
than 1,000 people were banned, EU borders were closed to non-EU 
citizens, and anyone coming into Germany was required to quaran-
tine for 14 days. Between mid-March and mid-April 2020, confirmed 
Covid-19 cases spiked, peaking at just over 6,000 a day (a number 
well below other EU peaks) before falling to less than 1,000 per day 
by late April and early May. 
According to German health experts, ample and effective public 
health authority capacity and facilities underpinned the country’s 
coordinated strategy of prevent (through data, analysis and crisis 
management), detect (through scaled up testing), contain (particu-
larly by limiting transmission to long-term care facilities) and treat 
(made possible because of existing hospital and intensive care 
unit (ICU) capacity and because healthcare workers had adequate 
protective equipment) (Wieler et al. 2020). Germany also reached 
out and collaborated with France, Italy and the Netherlands to 
pre-order 300 million doses of an in-development Covid-19 vaccine 
(Varagur 2020). In consequence, most Germans look favourably on 
the Government’s coordinated response. According to one survey, 
over 70% of respondents stated that “Berlin’s coronavirus policies 
were ‘more democratic than undemocratic, more fair than unfair, 
more competent than incompetent’” (Rahn 2020). Indeed, one gets 
the sense that in German state authorities put the public interest 
first in how it sought to manage the Covid-19 crisis.
Having managed the immediate health crisis, however, is by no 
means the same as averting the economic crisis. As is the case every-
where, the German economy and people’s livelihoods were dramat-
ically and suddenly impacted by the lockdown measures designed 
to contain the spread of Covid-19. In response, two supplementary 
budgets were penned authorizing additional fiscal spending of €156 
billion (4.9% of Germany’s Gross Domestic Product – GDP) in March 
Public Banks and Covid-19
 151
2020 and another €130 billion (4% of GDP) in June 2020 (IMF 2020). 
The Government funds were (and are) destined for healthcare pro-
visioning, vaccine research, financial supports for students, work-
ers and families, grants for small businesses and the self-employed, 
and expanded unemployment benefits. The Government funds also 
provided for various bank credit guarantees, as well as green invest-
ment and digitalization subsidies to support economic stabilization 
and recovery. Within this flurry of economic crisis and public fi-
nance responses, the German public bank, the KfW, has assumed 
a central role in Covid-19 crisis recovery, both at home and abroad.
THE KFW AS A DYNAMIC PUBLIC BANK
The KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, or ‘Credit Institute for 
Reconstruction’) is a public development bank (or ‘promotional’ 
bank in EU terminology). It was founded in a time of crisis, in 1948, 
as an institutional vessel meant to manage post-World War II re-
construction funds coming to Germany via the US Marshall Plan 
(hence, ‘reconstruction’ in its name). Over the decades, the KfW 
has expanded significantly and evolved dynamically (Marois forth-
coming). As a development bank, it does not maintain a branch net-
work (as it does not accept personal deposits) but it has acquired a 
network of 80 offices within Germany and around the world. It had 
6,705 employees in 2019. 
Housed in a high-income advanced capitalist European country, 
the KfW has grown to be one of the world’s largest public banks (Hu-
bert and Cochrane 2013; Moslener et al. 2018). According to Orbis 
BankFocus, an online database for all banking institutions, the KfW 
had assets totaling US$569 billion in 2019. This makes the KfW the 
89th largest bank in the world, out of some 32,000 public and private 
institutions, and the 15th largest public bank, out of 910 public in-
stitutions, with more than twice the total assets of the World Bank. 
Unlike the overwhelming majority of private banks around the 
Thomas Marois
152 
world, the KfW is by mandate not a profit-maximizing bank. That 
is, it has not built up its current mass of public financial capital by 
ruthlessly pursuing financial returns, as so many of the so-called 
too-big-to-fail corporate banks have done. This does not mean it 
is a loss-making bank. The KfW has an average return on assets 
(ROAA) of 0.35% (between 2012 and 2019) (whereas many private 
banks average 1-2% ROAA). In turn, this netted the KfW an annual 
average profit of US$2.10 billion over this same period, which are 
then recycled back into the bank’s reserves to be used for further 
lending (Marois forthcoming). The point is that public policy and 
political direction, not profit maximization, are at the core of the 
bank’s institutional persistence and functional orientation (Deeg 
1999; Naqvi et al. 2018). In the words of one KfW Regional Manager, 
the rationale of public banks are to do ‘public tasks’ (confidential 
interview, online, October 12, 2020). Despite not being oriented to-
wards profit-making, neoclassical economists and neoliberal ad-
vocates nonetheless (absurdly) insist on assessing public banks on 
how their profitability levels stand up against other profit-maximiz-
ing private banks (see La Porta et al. 2002). For those knowledgeable 
about the public banking sector, this ideological grafting of private 
accumulation logics onto all public banks, regardless of context, is 
nonsensical (Schmit et al. 2011, 104):
This wide range of underlying economic rationales [of public 
financial institutions in Europe] renders meaningless most 
performance-based analyses of public sector banks, since all 
that such analyses measure is financial performance (which 
presupposes the overriding aim of profit maximisation), ne-
glecting all other kinds of objectives pursued by public finan-
cial institutions.
There are other ways of operating than according to private 
performance measures. In this the KfW is a decidedly ‘public’ and 
‘dynamic’ bank, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is firmly sit-
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uated within the German public sphere, being legally owned by the 
Federal Republic of Germany (80%) and by the federal states (20%). 
At the same time, the KfW is run according to public law, not pri-
vate (specifically, the Law Concerning KfW). The public purpose of 
the KfW is represented in its mandate, which is to provide for the 
“sustainable improvement of the economic, social, and ecological 
conditions of people’s lives”. This mandate and the bank’s opera-
tions are mediated by German Government ministries and their 
political priorities and by the bank’s own governing Board, which 
together constitute a representative democratic form of institution-
al governance (see Hubert and Cochrane 2013; Marois 2017). Im-
portantly, KfW’s Board is broad-based and legally-defined. By law, 
the Board has 37 members: it is co-chaired by the Federal Minis-
ters of Finance and Economic Affairs and Energy in rotation plus 
35 further members drawn from German society. These include 
14 appointments divided between the German Bundestag (Lower 
House) and Bundesrat (Upper House) and five more federal gov-
ernment ministers. The mortgage banks, savings banks, coopera-
tive banks, commercial banks and business credit institutions each 
have a representative on the KfW Board, as do German municipal-
ities, agriculture, crafts, trade and housing associations. The KfW 
Board membership is rounded off by representatives from four 
trade unions and two from industry.
As the KfW is located within the German public sphere, it can 
be shielded from direct exposure to market-based and financialized 
operational imperatives. A key element to this market shielding is 
the German state’s formal guarantee of the KfW’s stability, which 
translates into a very strong credit rating as the likelihood of default 
on monies borrowed is seen as remote by market actors (S&P AAA). 
This helps the KfW enjoy preferential access to global financial mar-
kets and receive the lowest possible interest rates. In the current 
low rate environment, this can mean borrowing near, at and even 
below 0% interest rates (that is, the KfW has borrowed long-term 
debt with negative yields) (Ramnarayan 2019). Indeed, KfW govern-
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ment-backed debt is often regarded as a proxy for German ‘bunds’ 
(government bonds). This is important as most incoming sources 
of KfW capital now come via bond issuances in global markets (in 
addition to the year-on-year build up of retained earnings) (Naqvi et 
al. 2018, 681-82; KfW 2019, 12-13). As part of its public mandate, the 
KfW then passes on such financial advantages through the public 
sphere to its mandated ‘promotional’ lending. The spread between 
what the rate KfW borrows at and lends at is determined both by 
mandated lending programmes and by the need to be financially 
‘sustainable’ (that is, to cover operating costs and lending losses).
In its more than seven decades of operation, the KfW has been 
anything but a static financial institution. In its first decades of op-
eration, it moved beyond its initial post-World War II reconstruction 
role to involve itself in foreign aid operations and to situate itself as 
a cornerstone of German domestic and export-oriented industri-
alization, particularly by supporting small- and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) (Deeg 1999; Moslener et al. 2018). The KfW would 
go on to play a central role in German reunification and acquire a 
catalytic hand in German energy transition. 
None of these institutional changes come without challenges, 
conflict and contradictions (Marois forthcoming). On the one hand, 
for example, KfW industrial lending has grown significantly and 
has been geared towards accelerating domestic growth, thus un-
derpinning German economic expansionism (Naqvi et al. 2018). On 
the other hand, German society is increasingly conscious of the en-
vironmental impacts of endless industrial growth, demanding that 
the KfW be more ‘green’ and ensure reductions in carbon emissions 
(cf. Angel 2017; Paul 2018). The KfW attempts to balance these of-
ten-competing demands. Currently, about 40% of all lending helps 
to reduce carbon (although 60% continues to carbonize the envi-
ronment) (KfW 2017, 2; KfW 2019, 3). In recognition of such ‘green’ 
changes, however incomplete, the KfW is seen as an industry leader 
in environmental financing (Ervine 2018, 149-51). Still, at times KfW 
operations have caused controversy, including over costly subsidies 
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(as with its early promotions of solar panels for households) or in 
the operational mismanagement of its subsidiaries (such as the IKB 
financial scandal in 2008). No one should ever suggest that public 
banking is easy or that it should not be constantly held to account 
by the public.
The KfW nonetheless demonstrates that pro-public change is 
possible, even within the structural constraints of neoliberal finan-
cialization. In greening itself, the KfW has found innovative ways 
of connecting to the German public at a local level. For example, 
the KfW Energy-Efficient Urban Rehabilitation programme targets 
energy transitions within towns and cities and through munici-
pal entities and not-for profit institutions with energy-efficiency 
refurbishment loans for buildings (Bach 2017). This programme 
has a distinctly public-public character, with over €700 million in 
financing directly supporting municipal energy efficiency retrofit-
ting. Indeed, such public programme lending reflects the vision of 
public banks in Germany. The Association of German Public Banks 
(AGPB) writes that acting “on behalf of public authorities they [pub-
lic banks] perform tasks that support political goals” (AGPB 2014, 
3). This is reflected in KfW’s own mandate, which states that it pro-
vides “financing with a public mission” (KfW 2019b, 4). This public 
mission includes both public and private sector support, to the ex-
clusion of neither. The KfW is not without its problems but it has, 
nonetheless, found ways and acquired institutional patterns that 
suggest an enduring level of societal credibility that enable it to per-
sist and reproduce itself in the German context.
The KfW thus reflects four dimensions that can help us think 
about the bank as a ‘public’ and ‘dynamic’ bank.1 First, it is firmly 
located within the public sphere through ownership, control and 
1  These four dimensions are more fully explained in a forthcoming book-length mo-
nograph (Marois forthcoming). A key feature of this rethinking is to avoid ascribing 
to public banks any essentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’ characteristics because of their being 
publicly-owned. Instead, it is far more important to empirically and historically fo-
cus on what public banks do and why. This means examining how contentious social 
forces in society struggle to make and remake public banks over time.
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legal mandate. Second, it performs banking functions that, as and 
because they evolve over time, suggest that the KfW has no innate 
purpose or essential policy orientation. The KfW, in other words, 
is made and remade by social forces over time and in the context 
of Germany. Third, the KfW functions in public and private inter-
ests, responding to needs within the public sector and to those in 
the private sector. The balance or imbalance of this functioning is 
the result of competing interests over what the bank does. This too 
suggests that there is nothing innate or essential to being ‘public’ as 
each bank will acquire different orientations and functions depend-
ing on the power relationships in which it is embedded.
Finally, the KfW persists as a credible, contested and evolving in-
stitution, meaning it will always be subject to the pull of competing 
and class-divided interests so long as it exists and persist as an insti-
tution within capitalism. This framing provides a sober understand-
ing of the KfW as a public bank. It grafts nothing essentially negative 
or positive onto the institution by virtue of merely being ‘public’ but 
focuses attention on how it is made to function institutionally. The 
bank is understood as perennially open to dynamic change, poten-
tially progressive and potentially oppressive, as a result of social forc-
es making it so in time- and place-bound historical circumstances 
in capitalism. The KfW, and public banks generally, are already un-
avoidably contested, and therefore dynamic, institutions (and those 
concerned with a green and just transition ought to recognize this). 
This more open way of thinking about the KfW can help us to give 
some context to its Covid-19 support at home and abroad.
DOMESTIC COVID-19 SUPPORTS
As a domestic response to the impact of Covid-19 in Germany, the 
German Government tasked the KfW with expanding its credit of-
ferings and guarantees for all sizes of firms, credit insurers and 
non-profit institutions, thus increasing the total volume of KfW 
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lending by “at least €757 billion (24 percent of GDP)” (IMF 2020). 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), such lending 
may include “facilities for public equity injection into firms with 
strategic importance.” In the first half of 2020, “KfW’s financing vol-
ume more than doubled as a result of coronavirus aid programmes” 
(KfW 2020b). The German Government at the same time relaxed 
national financial regulatory requirements so that KfW-backed 
Covid-19 support loans given out by other financial institutions 
would not negatively impact their leverage ratios or exposure lim-
its. Local and regional governments in Germany likewise provided 
additional financial supports to their own state and municipal pub-
lic banks to support recovery.
KfW action was first initiated on March 11, 2020, when Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel announced that the Government would do 
whatever it took to address the Covid-19 crisis. The KfW was key to 
the Government’s strategy, particularly in terms of the German Eco-
nomic Stabilisation Fund (FRGFA 2020). On March 23, 2020, Federal 
Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Peter Altmaier made the 
following statement (FMF 2020):
It is now important to help companies quickly and without 
red tape. An important element here is to provide access to 
liquidity. The improved financing conditions set out in the 
KfW Special Programme 2020 will help to significantly sup-
port the economy in this respect. Applications will be pro-
cessed quickly and without undue bureaucracy. Payments 
will be made as quickly as possible because we know that, 
for many enterprises, every week counts.
No doubt behind the scenes discussions had been underway 
between the KfW and the Government in the preceding weeks. 
Just prior to this announcement, Finance Minister Scholtz had 
said that the KfW would receive a €100 billion loan to support the 
programme lending being asked of it by the Government (Chazan 
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2020). Moreover, the Government announced that, with official 
backing, the KfW could lend without limit to businesses in trou-
ble (Chazan 2020). The benefit of the Government lending to and 
through the KfW is that the bank can then leverage its accumulated 
financial capacity and expertise. At the same time, the funds chan-
nelled through the KfW can be further magnified and dispersed via 
the country’s existing public and private banks, as well as through 
the expansive and powerful public savings banks, the Sparkasse 
system. It is important to acknowledge the historic built up Ger-
many’s public financial legacy, a legacy that does not exist in other 
advanced capitalist systems like the US and the UK. The Chair of 
the Board of Managing Directors at KfW, Günther Bräunig, under-
scores this point (FMF 2020):
The banks and KfW have prepared intensively for today. 
Never before have we been able to put a full programme 
together this quickly. The federal government will assume 
close to full liability and the loan margins are extremely low.
As of late September 2020, the KfW had on offer four aid/loan 
programmes providing financial support to companies, self-em-
ployed people and freelance workers (KfW 2020a). These loans are 
to provide liquidity and to help cover operating costs, thus giving 
businesses and individuals time to overcome the crisis.
KfW Instant Loans for medium-sized enterprises 
The KfW Instant Loans for medium-sized enterprises is a pro-
gramme that is notable for its speed of delivery – that is, basically 
‘instant’. The necessary conditions are fairly basic: it is meant for 
medium-sized firms of with more than 10 employees, which are 
active since at least January 1, 2019, and which are profitable on 
average for the three previous years. The credit amounts available 
then vary according to firm size. Ten-year loans are granted at 3% 
interest. The issuing or on-lending bank is backed 100% by the KfW 
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(which is in turn backed by the Federal Government). The structure 
allows for the rapid granting and release of credits for eligible com-
panies as, once the conditions are met, no further risk assessment 
needs be done by the issuing bank or by the KfW.2
KfW loan for companies on the market for 
longer than five years (Entrepreneur Loan)
The KfW Entrepreneur Loan is meant to assist with investments 
and to provide for working capital for companies that are older than 
five years. For larger companies, the KfW assumes 80% of the risk 
while for small- and medium-sized companies, it assumes and up to 
90%. Qualifying companies can apply for up to €100 million, subject 
to a series of conditions.
KfW loan for young companies on the 
market for less than five years
For companies that are less than five years old, the KfW has the ERP 
Start-up Loan. The conditions are similar to the Entrepreneur Loan 
(80% for large companies and up to 90% for SMEs, with access to up 
to €100 million), just with a shorter time period of being in opera-
tion as the basis of qualifying.
KfW Special Programme
Finally, there is the large-scale Special Programme meant for in-
vestment and working capital in medium-sized and large compa-
nies. The programme involves syndicated financing wherein the 
KfW takes on direct participation of at least €25 million but no more 
2  The KfW showed dynamism in its initial response to the pandemic. As in many 
other countries around the world, the commercial banks balked at only receiving 
an 80% guarantee for funds to be on-lent to struggling companies. They saw their 
capital at risk everywhere. Within days of first announcing its 80% and even 90% 
guarantees, the KfW reviewed and then improved its programme. The 100% guaran-
tee loan programme was then rolled out on April 3, 2020, which allowed commercial 
banks, public and private, to lend out Covid-19 support funds without risk (Mertens 
et al. 2020, 6). This became the KfW Instant Loan.
Thomas Marois
160 
than 50% of the total debt. The KfW assumes 80% of the risk, sub-
ject to certain conditions being met.
The KfW reports that, as of June 30, 2020, it had received 70,000 
loan applications and had in turn lent out just under €34 billion 
(KfW 2020b). The lion’s share of applications (some 97%) came 
from SMEs with almost all of the loans (indeed 99.8%) being for 
up to €3 million in support. By mid-August 2020, loan applications 
had topped 81,000 and KfW loan commitments neared €43 billion. 
While part of the four programmes above, the KfW also directed 
support towards students, via the KfW Student Loan, which is a ze-
ro-interest rate loan provided until March 31, 2021. As of mid-Au-
gust 2020, about 24,000 students applied with KfW loan commit-
ments reaching €700 million.
INTERNATIONAL COVID-19 SUPPORTS: 
THE KFW DEVELOPMENT BANK
The KfW is a corporate banking group composed of five divisions, 
split into domestic and international operations. Domestically, the 
SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) and the Municipal and Private Client 
Bank (Kommunal- und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) make up 
the bulk of KfW lending (about two-thirds). Most of the Covid-19 
support is accounted for here. In 2012, KfW founded a fifth charita-
ble division, the KfW Stiftung, which is geared towards not-for-prof-
it projects in Germany. Abroad, the KfW IPEX Bank (project and 
export financing) and the Development Bank account for about a 
third of KfW lending. Here I look at some of the KfW Development 
Bank Covid-19 lending around the world and its role in facilitating 
development aid.
In this international aspect of KfW operations, the Develop-
ment Bank responds to funding requests from its partner coun-
tries (about 70 globally). KfW partner countries include ‘least 
developed countries’ with average gross national income (GNI) 
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per capita under US$992. Normally, the KfW assesses the devel-
opment project, usually via the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) or the European Commis-
sion, which takes the final funding decision. So too with Covid-19 
aid. Consequently, KfW aid and lending decisions are mediated 
by the public sphere. Where existing national development banks 
are already in place in the partner countries, the KfW can work 
with and through these institutions, refinancing their domestic 
loan programmes. Otherwise, the KfW works with local clients 
and beneficiaries, whether they are public or private institutions, 
depending on the domestic programme.
According to Marc Engelhardt, Head of the Task Force of KfW 
Development Bank, the KfW will offer about €5 billion in Covid-19 
financial support via the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Emergency Covid-19 Support Programme 2020 
(KfW 2020c). These emergency funds will be followed up with addi-
tional Federal Government support funds that will also be channelled 
through the KfW in the coming months and years. The immediate 
concern, however, was for the KfW to react swiftly to support health 
initiatives and social security and to help public and private sectors 
weather the initial storm of the pandemic. According to Engelhardt, 
“[t]ime is an especially critical factor in this pandemic. This is why 
we want to pay out all of the additional Federal Government budget 
funds this year, to make tangible improvements in our partner coun-
tries very fast.” As of mid-July 2020, the KfW had supported 140 proj-
ects globally, focused on Africa and the Middle East, but including 
commitments in Asia, Southeastern and Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. Having acquired not only significant financial capacity, but 
also decades of institutional expertise and development memory, the 
KfW also provides technical support around the design, preparation 
and implementation of funded projects. Such internal technical sup-
port and expertise is often a feature of public development banks, for 
example, with the North American Development Bank, the Nordic 
Investment Bank and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
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Development. Internal to the KfW, Engelhardt notes that it can lever-
age its domestic experiences as well, for example, by learning from 
how the KfW at home rapidly supported German SMEs in order to 
provide similar support in Central America via its regional develop-
ment bank, the BCIE. Below I review four country- and region-specif-
ic Covid-19 interventions by the KfW Development Bank.
KfW and Covid-19 in Peru
The KfW, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), has loaned Peru €250 million 
(KfW 2020d). The loan’s framework connects plans to combat the 
impacts of Covid-19 to realizing climate and environmental goals 
in Peru. It does so by first providing financial support to small busi-
nesses and their employees to overcome the immediate economic 
crisis and then, as recovery takes shape, by channeling resources 
into green investments.
In the first instance, the priority is rapid dispersal to help the 
heavily informal workforce in Peru, which is disproportionately 
impacted by the pandemic and related lockdowns. This meant tar-
geting micro and small enterprises, many of which have little ac-
cumulated capital to weather the storm of economic restrictions 
imposed but nonetheless employ upwards of 50% of Peruvians. The 
KfW does not lend directly to such enterprises but needs to work 
through a local institution, which in this case involved the Peruvian 
public development bank, COFIDE (Corporación Financiera de De-
sarrollo or Development Finance Corporation). COFIDE was found-
ed in 1971 under the Velasco military regime to promote business in-
vestments.3 It has since evolved. In the 1980s, the Government made 
COFIDE subject to private, not public law. Since then COFIDE has 
tended to on-lend to other financial entities in Peru. As of 2019, it has 
US$3.2 billion in assets and a return of average assets of 0.25% (Or-
bis BankFocus October 2, 2020). According to the KfW, COFIDE has 
3  For more on COFIDE and public banks in Peru, see Dancourt and Jiménez 
Sotelo 2018.
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supported over 300,000 micro and small enterprises during the pan-
demic. The bulk of the KfW loan will go towards supporting COFIDE 
in this area. What is less clear is the extent to which this massive loan 
will in fact be green. The KfW reports that the Peruvian Government 
committed to reduce carbon emissions by 30% and to promote sus-
tainable development, so long as this was backed by international 
aid, presumably including contributions from the KfW. No further 
details were forthcoming. A KfW Regional Manager confirms, how-
ever, that firm survival and jobs are the first priority and that they 
are not yet able to turn efforts towards energy efficiency, greening, 
and so on (confidential interview, online, October 12, 2020).
KfW and Covid-19 in Senegal
In Senegal, the KfW has facilitated the transfer of a German Gov-
ernment grant worth €100 million (KfW 2020e). The purpose of the 
grant is to help address the economic and social impacts of the pan-
demic. A further €124 million in grant money will be provided by 
the European Union (EU) [which combines contributions from EU 
Member States and the European Commission, as well as from two 
other EU public banks, the European Investment Bank (see Clifton 
et al, this volume) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development]. A key feature of this programme is that the funds 
provided are pure grants, and are therefore non-repayable. The 
funds are intended to support micro-, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and related jobs and to help the Government meet its 
needs, particularly in the health sector. The funds are expected to 
be dispersed by the end of October 2020.
KfW and Covid-19 in Zambia
In Zambia, the KfW partnered with UNICEF and the Zambian Min-
istry of Health to provide €20 million in emergency Covid-19 pan-
demic containment financial support (KfW 2020f). The German 
BMZ will provide the funds, which are to be directed by the KfW 
towards hospitals, for use at Covid-19 treatment and isolation cen-
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tres and for broad-based support. Specifically, the KfW-facilitated 
aid package included the delivery of personal protective equipment 
for medical staff in early September 2020. This included surgical 
masks, gloves, oxygen devices and Covid-19 test kits to be distrib-
uted to 1,400 health centres. Support will also go towards training 
staff in the application of the Covid-19 tests. At the same time, the 
funds will support general health efforts, such as tuberculosis im-
munizations for infants and pregnant women. The KfW funds will 
further target improved water and sanitation services in schools, 
health centres and villages to help prevent the spread and impact of 
Covid-19. In both urban and rural areas, water purification chemi-
cals are to be provided. Finally, emergency income support for the 
poor and informal workers most impacted by the crisis will be pro-
vided. Via UNICEF, the BMZ and KfW will allocate €8.75 million in 
cash transfers meant to top up existing government payments to 
the poor to help cover basic needs in the coming months.
KfW support for Covid-19 research in Africa
In Africa more broadly, the KfW Development Bank has supported 
Covid-19 research geared towards finding reliable and rapid tests 
that can be made available to the poorest people and communities 
(KfW 2020g). In this case, it is the German Federal Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research (BMBF) that has made €25 million available to the 
KfW Development Bank. In turn, the KfW will direct BMBF support 
towards the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (€15 million) and 
the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (€10 million). This is 
an important intervention in the context of Covid-19, but the work 
of the KfW in this sector is not new as it has been active in drug re-
search and affordability initiatives since 2011. The aim has been “to 
develop new adapted diagnostic procedures that also work in places 
where there is often only basic health care.” The public ethos and 
pro-poor direction of KfW support here is clear. An unnamed KfW 
project manager states it in unambiguous terms (KfW 2020g):
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Inexpensive, fast and safe diagnostics and medication should 
actually be available to everyone. However, it has always 
been the poorer population groups in developing countries 
who have lost out. Traditionally, globally active pharmaceu-
tical companies invest around 90% of their research funds in 
the development of new drugs for diseases from which only 
the wealthy ten percent of humanity suffers.
The KfW not only supports such public health measures finan-
cially and morally. As a large, internationally active public develop-
ment bank, the KfW has acquired internal expertise of the kind not 
normally associated with banks. There are dedicated health pro-
fessionals and medical doctors on the KfW staff who are well-po-
sitioned to advise and support the bank’s financial operations with 
appropriate technical expertise. The KfW Development Bank thus 
illustrates a concrete pro-public alternative to what economist 
Mariana Mazzucato (2020) highlights as a highly problematic and 
contradictory strategy of using public health money (as in the US) 
to support private sector Covid-19 treatment and vaccine research 
that will be subsequently priced well beyond what most people can 
afford (at about US$3,000/treatment).
Public finance and banks are not always the solution, but they 
do offer important alternatives and their capacity could certainly 
be scaled up to meet pressing societal needs. Indeed, public banks 
can function in stark contrast to the profit-maximizing neoliberal 
model and can be made to confront societal challenges and crises 
in the public interest. Notably, the KfW in the first half of 2020 has 
announced Covid-19 related losses of €576 million (compared to 
a return of €904 in the first half of 2019), with similar losses ex-
pected for the second half of 2020 (KfW 2020b). This is, in effect, 
a wealth redistributive mechanism. Moreover, it is only through 
the public sphere and in the public interest that a bank could and 





Across its seven-decade journey, the KfW as a public financial in-
stitution has been both constituted by and constitutive of the world in 
which it reproduces itself. In the current context, one can see events 
and social forces having an effect on the KfW and in turn, the KfW 
affecting society around it. The exact measure of its Covid-19 inter-
ventions cannot yet be known, but undoubtedly they have helped 
to mitigate the Covid-19 crisis for many, at home and abroad. Let 
it not be forgotten that, in poorer countries, such support simply 
would not have been forthcoming. In Germany, without its existing 
public banking capacity, it too would have struggled to provide rap-
id and effective support, much as the US and the UK have struggled 
to do through banks that were either unwilling or unable to do so. 
By contrast, the KfW has often made time available to businesses, 
health providers, public services, governing authorities and even to 
students to help them adjust to the pandemic.
Apparently, however, KfW workers would like to see its interven-
tions go further and for the KfW to have a more sustained impact 
on society. According to KfW staff, “the emerging recovery process 
needs to be perceived as an opportunity to rethink our economic and 
social systems and promote a greener model for prosperity over the 
long term” (Lau and Müller-Späth 2020). We need to recognize, they 
continue, “the crisis as transformation” such that “green recovery” 
means confronting the economic and social impacts while aiming 
to reduce greenhouse gases and mitigating climate change. The KfW 
could and should play a catalytic role in a green transition.
No doubt the functions of the KfW in any green recovery and tran-
sition will be subject to contentious power struggles and the pull of 
public and private interests. This cannot be avoided within class-di-
vided capitalism given contending interests between the public good 
and private accumulation. Yet the KfW is a decidedly ‘public’ bank. 
Its institutional structure and historical legacy enable it to function in 
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pro-public ways – particularly at times of acute crisis and as we face 
huge societal challenges like climate change. Its representative form 
of governance enables the public interest to be heard. It can leverage 
not only its accumulated capital but its decades of built-up expertise 
in local economies, public services and even in health expertise. 
At times of crisis, the KfW can mobilize its capital and knowledge 
to confront the problem. It can do so, moreover, not based on the need 
to maximize its financial returns but on the need to respond to public 
mandates. This is possible because the bank has acquired a range of 
banking functions and built up its institutional capacity over time – 
including in its form of representative governance. Without such an 
institutional legacy no such emergency Covid-19 financial support 
would have been forthcoming through the public sphere. Governing 
forces would instead have to barter with private banks to provide sup-
port services by first bending Covid-19 recovery financial programmes 
to private interests and profit mandates in ways that meet the risk-re-
turn preferences of corporate shareholders. The existing capacity and 
historical legacy of the KfW provide an effective and viable alterna-
tive, one that needs to be built upon internationally as we move from 
Covid-19 recovery to a global green and socially-just transition.
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